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Government as Owner of Intellectual
Property? Considerations for Public
Welfare in the Era of Big Data
Ruth L. Okediji*
ABSTRACT

Open government data policies have become a significant part
of innovation strategies in many countries, allowing access, use and
re-use of government data to improve government transparency,foster
civic engagement, and expand opportunities for the creation of new
products and services. Rarely, however, do open data policies address
intellectual property rights that may arise from free access to
government data. Ownership of knowledge goods createdfrom big data
is governed by the default rules of intellectual property laws which
typically vest ownership in the creator/inventor.By allowing, and in
some cases actively encouraging, private capture of the downstream
goods created as a result of open datapolicies, governments may fail to
appropriateoptimal returns to the public for its investment in big data.
This Essay argues for coherence between open data policies and rules
governing government ownership of intellectual property. It highlights
the rule in US copyright law proscribing copyright in federal
government works, arguingthat public domain status is not invariably
welfare-enhancing. The rule is sufficiently malleable to permit the
federal government to assert ownership over knowledge assets
developed from access to data that it owns or controls. Claiming
copyright to engineer greater protection of the public interest could
foster economic growth and facilitate the distributive welfare goals of
intellectual property law more effectively than the public domain status
that presumptively attaches to federal government works.

William L. Prosser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. This
Article is based on my presentation at the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT &
TECHNOLOGY LAW 2014-15 Symposium Beyond Regulation: The US Government as Funder,
Creator, and User of Intellectual Property. I am grateful to Wendy Gordon and Paul Uhlir for
comments on an earlier draft, to Jerome Reichman for discussions about some of the ideas in the
Essay, and to participants at the symposium for their questions and input.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Governments all over the world generate, collect, and thus own
Determining what policies best regulate
massive amounts of data.
access to and use of the ever-increasing volume, velocity and variety'
of data-so-called "big data"'-to serve the public welfare is one of the
central challenges governments face today. Governmental and private

'Technologists often use the technical '3-V' definition of big data as 'high-volume,
1.
high-velocity and high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of
information processing for enhanced insight and decision making."' Neil M. Richards & Jonathan
H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 394 (2014) (quoting IT
[https://perma.cc/
Glossary:Big Data, GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data/
82MT-KRHU]); see id. (citing Doug Laney, 3D Data Management: Controlling Data Volume,
(Feb.
6,
2001), http://blogs.gartner.com/dougGARTNER
and
Variety,
Velocity,
laney/files/2012/01/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity-andVariety.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4SK-YJEP]).
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researchers increasingly have a wide range of tools available to engage

in big data analytics. New sampling techniques, satellite instruments,
microchip arrays, and dynamic software platforms have enabled
scientists to analyze and apply information-e.g., scientific, medical,
environmental-generated from a wide array of data sources, both

private and public, in seeking answers to national and global
challenges. 2 New knowledge and insights derived from big data may
offer solutions and inform important research trajectories in a variety
Proper analysis of scientific data could, for example,
of areas. 3

improve public health by more finely identifying causal links between4
demographic information and incidences of cancer or other disease;

data on climate change and biodiversity can help predict future
disruptions in agricultural markets, allowing governments to plan
In biology, big data has enormous potential in
well in advance.'
This massive amount of data has prompted many projects that seek to utilize and
2.
study it in a plethora of ways. See, e.g., M. van Rijmenam, Understandingthe Various Sources of
Big Data-Infographic, DATAFLOQ, Nov 7, 2015, https:/datafloq.comread/understandingsources-big-data-infographic/338 [https:/Iperma.cc/75B5-8LPJI (depicting the major sources of big
data: archives, documents, media, business applications, social media, public web, data storage,
machine log data, and sensor data); Z.D. Stephens, S.Y. Lee, F. Faghri, R.H. Campbell, C. Zhai,
M.J. Efron, et al., Big Data: Astronomical or Genomical?, 13(7) PLOS BIOL. (2015),
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doilO. 1371/
(comparing four
[https://perma.ccIU8GZ-C3W6]
journal.pbio.1002195&representation=PDF
major generators of big data, including genomics, astronomy, YouTube, and Twitter).
See, e.g., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION,
3.
COMPETITION,

AND

PRODUCTIVITY

(2011),

http:I/www.mckinsey.com/-/medial

McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGlfResearch/Technology%20and%20InnovationBi
g%20DataMGI_big-datafull report.ashx [https://perma.cc/NH6X-AJ3A] (defining "big data"
and its transformative potential across various sectors); D. BOLLIER, THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/flles/
2010),
Inst.,
(Aspen
DATA
BIG
[https://perma.cc/K9YW-HZZ8]
content/docs/pubs/ThePromise-andPeril-of BigData.pdf
(discussing the "new era of Big Data" and its implications for business, government, democracy,
and culture).
See, e.g., L. Ramsey, Cancer Treatment Is on the Brink of a Data Revolution,
4.
BUSINESS INSIDER, Sep. 22, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/big-data-and-cancer-2015-9
[https:/fperma.cc/KX4F-F6UE] ("Big data isn't just increasing the potential for what oncologists
can do with the information from hundreds of thousands of patients. Faster genetic sequencing
technologies are also helping companies find easier ways to track cancer treatments at a genetic
level."); B. Marr, How Big Data Is Transforming The Fight Against Cancer, FORBES, Jun. 28,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/06/28how-big-data-is-transforming-the2015,
fight-against-cancer/ [https://perma.cc/9F4J-BAYY] ("Big Data is being put to use in many ways
to aid the task of improving care, identifying risks and hopefully eventually producing cures.");
Case Western Reserve University School of Engineering, Using Big Data to Identify Cancers,
[https://perma.cc/H9PW-WUXL] (describing a
http://engineering.case.edu/big-data-cancer-ID
research project which used big data "to predict if a patient is suffering from aggressive triplenegative breast cancer, slower-moving cancers or non-cancerous lesions with 95 percent
accuracy").
See, e.g., H. Clark, How Big Data Is Helping Farmers Save Millions, GIZMAG, Oct.
5.
27, 2014, http://www.gizmag.comfbig-data-crops-climate-change/34400/ (discussing a computer
program analyzing weather data to improve crop yields); L. Del Bello, Big Data to Help Coffee
2015,
14,
May
SCIDEVNET,
Change,
Eliminate
to
Adapt
Farmers
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allowing scientists to move from hypotheses to working with actual
models built from the information collected and mined from data
banks. 6 Better science and improved treatment methods can emerge
from data generated by the US healthcare system. 7 In short, big
data-and the algorithmic tools that allow use of the data
transformatively-is a critical new frontier and resource for
innovation.
What should be the role of governments in controlling these
vast troves of information that many believe hold answers to various
contemporary problems? In the US, under the venerable rule in Feist,
now well-established in international law, facts are not eligible for
copyright protection.8
Thus, in theory, anyone may access and
use/reproduce the data 9 collected by the federal government without
violating copyright law. This may appear to eliminate any copyright
barriers (but not those barriers stemming from contract, digital locks
or other regulations) to the use of big data.
But simply accessing data is not where the innovative value
lies-it is in mining, learning from, and applying the new information
such data yields to create new products that enhance human welfare.
In the downstream application of data or the knowledge derived
therefrom, copyright rules may matter a great deal. For example, use
of the data may result in copyrightable works such as scientific
articles or computer applications.
In addition, building "data
commons" that link databases across related scientific fields is a
http://www.scidev.net/global/biodiversity/multimedia/big-data-coffee-farmers-climatechange.html [https://perma.cc17U86-REJK] (describing "software that combines satellite images
with big data on agricultural production, in an effort to support farmers in their [climate]
adaptation efforts").
6.
See, e.g., M. May, Big Biological Impacts from Big Data, SCIENCE, Jul. 13, 2014,
http://www.sciencemag.org/site/products/lst20140613.xhtml
[https:/perma.cc/NW64-G8J9]
('"rools and techniques for analyzing big data promise to mold massive mounds of information
into a better understanding of the basic biological mechanisms and how the results can be
applied in, for example, health care."); V. Marx, Biology: The Big Challenges of Big Data, 498
NATURE 255 (2013), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v498/n7453/full/498255a.html#ref2
[https://perma.ccNV4CK-V5VP] ("Harnessing powerful computers and numerous tools for data
analysis is crucial in drug discovery and other areas of big-data biology.").
7.
See, e.g., B. Kayyali, D. Knott & S. Van Kuiken, The Big-Data Revolution in US Health
Care: Accelerating Value
and
Innovation, McKINsEY
& COMPANY,
Apr.
2013,
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health-systems-and-services/the-big-data-revolution_
in us health-care [httpsJ/perma.c/5Z4V-3SB4].
8.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See also
Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A ComparativeAnalysis of The Notion Of Originality In
Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE USA 949 (2002); TRIPS Agreement, Art. 10 (2).
9 OMB Circular A-130 provides guidance on this to federal agencies. Executive Office of
the President, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-130, Revised:
Management of Federal Information Resources, Transmittal Memorandum No. 4 (Nov. 28, 2000),
2000
WL
33969135, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars-al30_al3Otrans4/
[https://perma.cc/EQ6A-XFXP].
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crucial aspect of advancing the progress of science; such cross-linkages
may generate particular original selections or compilations of data

that are subject to copyright protection. 10 Moreover, simply adding an
analysis to a data set means the resulting collective work would also
attract copyright protection and trigger the full array of copyright and

para-copyright rights under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA). 11
Section 105 of the 1976 US Copyright Act prohibits copyright
in works of the federal government. 12 The public domain status of
federal government works is a deliberate policy choice justified in
reference to the public interest although, as described below, there are
important exceptions to the rule. With respect to big data, it is easy to

assume that the public interest is also best supported or advanced
of
"open
data"-making
by
adopting
a
policy
simply
government-collected or created data freely available. And just like

the default rule for prohibition of copyright in federal government
works, there are important reasons to have a firm commitment to
open data. 13 Indeed, we are already seeing important innovation
coming from cities that have adopted an open-data approach. 14
However, with its unrivaled capacity to generate big data and
to control the data generated by others, the US government has an

important opportunity to shape the extent to which the public benefits
10.
See Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law and Science
Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a Global Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV.
1362 (2012).
11.
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA], § 1201, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998); see also Daniel J. Gervais, The Protectionof Databases, 82 CHI. -KENT L. REV.
1109 (2007); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990).
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
12.
13.
See OMB Circular A-130 supra note 9. See also Paul F. Uhlir, The Value of Open
Data Sharing, International Council for Science (ICS) Committee on Data for Science and
(Nov.
Version
1
Technology
(CODATA),
2015), https://www.earthobservations.org/documents/dsp/20151130the-value-ofopen-data-sha
ring.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6SB-GCW2].
14.
See, e.g., J. Hamill, Could Google Maps End Poverty?, FORBES, Jan. 28, 2014,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasperhamill/2014/01/28/could-google-maps -help-end-poverty/
[https://perma.ccK2JE-QCWH] (discussing the "Transparent Chennai" program, which digitally
mapped slums in the Indian city of Chennai and led to improvements in the delivery of social
services); New City Crime Database Goes Online, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sep. 14, 2011,
http://www.chicagotribune.comlnewsflocal/breaking/chi-new-city-crime-database- goes-online20110914-story.html [https://perma.cc/2H2R-DHBC] (announcing the publication of an online
searchable database of crime incident reports in Chicago, allowing "residents to evaluate their
own neighborhoods, academics to study crime and techie types to create websites or apps"); Z.
Tumin, New York's HHS-Connect: IT Crosses Boundaries in a Shared-Missiont World,
GOVERNING.cOM, Aug. 24, 2009, http://www.governing.com/blogsfbfc/New-Yorks-HHS- ConnectIT.html [https:flperma.ccWBY7-7NWT] (outlining the benefits of New York City's
"HHS-Connect," an integration platform facilitating "cross-boundary reform of the social services
domain"); GOLDSMITH & CRAWFORD, infra note 21.
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from the "data deluge" and the innovation potential that such data
offers. This will require more than just open-data policies. It may also
require reconsideration of copyright's ownership rule for federal
government works.
This Essay explores the role of the government in facilitating
the proverbial intellectual property (IP) balance, not only as a
legislator and enforcer of IP laws and their limits, but also as a
market participant in the ownership of inputs critical to the creation
of knowledge goods. I suggest that the innovation potential and
economic value of big data should compel a more considered and
possibly different set of copyright ownership rules.
Access to data by as many users as possible is necessary to
maximize dynamic and rapidly evolving forms and avenues of
innovation characteristic of the digital age. To this end, open data
policies are a great starting point. Such policies should, however, be
linked to terms and conditions that facilitate optimal access to
copyrighted works that may result from applications of insights and
knowledge gained from big data. What is required are appropriate
links between policies that regulate government ownership of data
and the rules of copyright ownership for government works, including
works created in whole or in part with government funding. The
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act emphasizes government
flexibility, supporting the argument that there is room to reconsider
the current statutory default rule for federal government works.
Moreover, some of the justifications that underlie the public domain
status of most federal government works apply with equal force to
federal government ownership in downstream goods created as a
result of its open access policies namely, that the public has already
paid at least partially for the creation of those goods.
Part II of this Essay reviews the nature and scope of copyright
It highlights the well-known
ownership in government works.
relationship between government and rights holders, foreshadowing
the highly dysfunctional legislative process that enables the
compromises that have persistently endangered the public welfare
objectives of the IP system. 15 Part III examines how some foreign
governments have embraced a more explicit role in assuring access to
government-owned data and copyrighted works by adopting access
Jessica Litman's foundational work on copyright's legislative history is the leading
15.
analysis of how the government's core policy function has been consistently delegated to
stakeholder industries. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); see also Jessica D. Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 33 (1994) ("Congress, for its part, has, since the turn of the
century, been delegating the policy choices involved in copyright matters to the industries
affected by copyright.").
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models

vest

that

work

around

existing

rules

that

copyright in government works. I point out that a baseline rule of

government ownership of IP rights does not necessarily impair or
impede prospects for strengthening public access to knowledge goods
and innovation, any more than a public domain baseline rule

ineluctably advances the public welfare.
Finally, Part IV draws conclusions about the role of
government in view of contemporary challenges in intellectual
property law. I suggest three possible models for regulating data and

downstream

creativity

notwithstanding

which

default

rule

of

copyright ownership a national government adopts.

II. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Section 105 of the US Copyright Act expressly precludes
federal government claims of copyright ownership in its works. 6 This
classic rule is, however, subject to exceptions that in reality make US
government ownership of copyrightable works legally feasible and
common.
The legislative history of § 105 states that Congress
deliberately avoided "making any sort of outright, unqualified
prohibition against copyright in works prepared under Government
contract or grant" for the same public interest justifications
17
underlying the public domain status of federal government works.
For example, a federal contractor may choose to assign her copyright
interest in any protected work resulting from the use of
government-owned data to the government.18 The federal government
may condition certain grants or other funding on the grantee

16.
See Copyright Act supra note 12.
17.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 59 (1976). ("A more difficult and far-reaching problem
is whether the definition should be broadened to prohibit copyright in works prepared under U.S.
Government contract or grant. As the bill is written, the Government agency concerned could
determine in each case whether to allow an independent contractor or grantee, to secure
copyright in works prepared in whole or in part with the use of Government funds.) A work
produced by a government contractor is subject to copyright protection, although the rules differ
between civilian contracts and those in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) or the military. See Frequently Asked Questions About Copyright, COMMERCE, ENERGY,
NASA,
&
DEF.
INFO.
MANAGERS
GRP.
[CENDI]
4.1
(Oct.
8,
2008),
http://www.cendi.gov/publications/04-8copyright.html [http://perma.cc/9SDA-QCMQ].
18.
17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012); see also CENDI, supra note 17, at 4.5 ("The Government is
not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment. A Copyright
assigned or otherwise transferred to the Government does not lose its copyright status or
protection. The Government may record transfers of copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office
and may register copyrights transferred to it.").
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providing a royalty-free government license that allows the public use
of any resulting copyrightable work.19
The flexibility to design policies related to IP ownership is
arguably greater with state governments. There is no proscription for
state or local government ownership of copyright; state and local
governments can-and do-assert ownership in their works despite
strong intuition that the same considerations that inform the default
rule codified in § 105 apply equally to state government works. 20 In
short, despite the official rule, governments at all levels can structure
rules that enhance or diminish their ownership interests in
copyrighted works. This is especially the case with state and local
governments, many of which are already experimenting with how to
more effectively enhance public welfare through applications of big
data in areas such as education, transport, crime prevention,
sanitation, land management, and others. 21 Many of these efforts
generate copyrightable software applications, compilations, computer
models and other literary works. Copyright ownership of these works
will determine how optimally the government can address
distributional justice issues using these goods directly in its provision
of services to the community, or by promoting optimal access to the
goods by less privileged members of society. So what is the copyright
ownership status of such works? The answer is surprisingly unclear.
In cases where the work was created by a state employee
acting within the scope of her employment, there is a strong argument
19.
Certainly some agencies require grantees to make scholarly works developed from
grants freely available. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 59 (1976).
For more related discussion, see infra, Part III.
CENDI, supra note 17, at 3.1.3 ("State and local governments may and often do
20.
claim copyright in their publications. It is their prerogative to set policies that may allow,
require, restrict or prohibit claim of copyright on some or all works produced by their
government units."). A lawsuit challenging copyright ownership in state laws currently is
making its way through the courts. See American Society for Testing and Materials d/b/a ASTM
Int'l, et al. v. Public.Resource.org, Inc. Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-01215-TSC (US District Court,
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/district-ofColumbia),
of
District
columbialdcdce/1:2013cv01215/161410 [https://perma.cc/J6SB-GCW2].
See, e.g., S. GOLDSMITH & S. CRAWFORD, THE RESPONSIVE CITY: ENGAGING
21.
COMMUNITIES THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE (2014) (using case studies from New York
City, Boston, and Chicago to illustrate the value of big data as a tool for improving government
services and performance in a variety of areas); S. Rich, Boosting Innovation by Rethinking
Government Procurement, GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 28, 2013, http://www.govtech.com
(discussing
budget-finance/Boosting-Innovation-by-Rethinking-Government-Procurement.htm
innovative projects in North Carolina and Philadelphia to improve government procurement);
J. Zauzmer, Mayor Gray Celebrates DC's Good Grades, WASHINGTON POST, Jul. 9, 2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mayor-gray-celebrates-dcs-good-grades/
[https://perma.cc/EVS3-GZHY]
2013/07/09b830fd8c-e8d3-1le2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
(discussing the "Grade D.C." program, which allows municipal agencies to collect and analyze
citizen feedback on the quality of social services and to make appropriate improvements);
MCKINSEY, supranote 3.
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that the work is presumptively in the public domain, as it would be for
works created under similar circumstances by a federal employee.
Alternatively, copyright ownership would reside in the state
government under a typical work-for-hire scenario. Conflict over
copyright ownership in this context would likely require case by case
analysis given the ambiguity surrounding state copyright ownership
claims under the 1976 Copyright Act.
Copyright ownership of works created from access to big data
may also be governed by contract law, be determined by the terms of
the open data policy, or by some other applicable policy adopted by the
state, if any. In sum, if open-data policies do not also address
copyright matters, there are numerous possible outcomes for copyright
ownership depending on the context in which the work was created.
First, the work could be in the public domain; second, copyright
ownership in creative works produced by applications of big data may
reside in private citizens who authored the work, absent any
contractual agreements to the contrary; third, copyright ownership
may reside in state employees who authored the work absent any
state policy or employee work-for hire default rule; fourth, there could
be a claim for joint-authorship by some combination of the different
parties-the state, state employees, and private citizens. Of the
numerous options, re-privatizing creative works produced from
open-data regimes is arguably the least welfare-enhancing but also
the most likely outcome for reasons I will now briefly discuss.
The history of intellectual property is firmly rooted in the
government's neoclassical economic ideology and relationship with
elite market actors, starting with the patronage system and
continuing through the rise of free trade economics to the welfare
state, to the current deregulated so-called "sharing economy. ' 22 This
Part provides an initial overview of the history of governments' early
conceptualization of intellectual property as the object of state law,
followed by an overview of the statutory public domain default rule for
federal government works established in the 1976 Copyright Act. The
Part concludes with a discussion of practices in other countries where
government ownership of its works has been leveraged to enhance the
public good.

22.
Joanna Kulesza & Roy Balleste, Signs and Portents in Cyberspace: The Rise of Jus
Internet as a New Order in International Law, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1311, 1336 (2013) (discussing the Internet as a hybrid economy that allows commercial success
to derive from sharing economies); Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the
Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HoUS. L. REV. 1115,
1148-49 (2009) (arguing that developing countries should "participate actively" in initiatives
such as the sharing economy).
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A. HistoricalAntecedents
In 1689, John Locke famously wrote in his Two Treatises on
23
Government that a man is entitled to the fruits of his own labor.
How this principle applies in the realm of intellectual property, where
the "fruits" at issue are intangible and the "labor" has occurred largely
in the mind of the creator, has engendered important scholarly debate
The question is further complicated when
and examination. 24
considering the different roles of the government in the intellectual
property sphere. On the one hand, the government is tasked with
ensuring both that the exclusive rights it grants to creators in fact
serve the public and that works are meaningfully accessible, while on
the other hand the government has long been the owner of such rights
in one capacity or another and seeks as much as any other rational IP
owner to maximize rent.
In sixteenth century England, it was the Crown that possessed
the power "to grant printing privileges over individual texts as well as
entire classes of work. ' 25 While this exercise of royal control was
motivated in part by efforts to control the press and the content of
ecclesiastical publications, 2 6 it was also a method of controlling the
market for certain types of works to both preserve its power and
enrich rulers. In some cases, not even creators could print their own
works without government permission. 27 Though control of printing
regulations was later granted to the Stationers' Company, creating
what became known as the "stationers' copyright," some
commentators argue that this transfer was essentially a guise for
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, in THE WORKS OF JOHNS LOCKE 116
23.
(1823), http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econlugcm/3113Ilocke/government.pdf [http://perma.cc/
3SMG-KHQG].
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
24.
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 (1993) (describing how the
natural rights theory and intellectual property intersect); see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ACT SURVEY 3 (6th ed. 2012). For

example, Locke would likely reward a person for their labor in producing a work, and yet
copyright law does not recognize the "sweat of the brow" doctrine. MERGES, supra note 24, at 3.
Ronan Deazley, Commentary on: The Articles of the Pope's Bulle (1518), PRIMARY
25.
SOURCES

ON

COPYRIGHT

showRecord?id=commentary
26.
SOURCES

(2008),

http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/requestl

uk 1518 [http://perma.cc/5THL-RZ4H].

Id.; Ronan Deazley, Commentary on: Henrician Proclamation (1538), PRIMARY
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/canitools/request
(2008),
COPYRIGHT
ON

[hereinafter Henrician
[http://perma.cc/2SRY-R2PXI
showRecord?id=commentaryuk_1538
Proclamation].
The Henrician Proclamation "prohibit[ed] the printing and publishing of
27.
ecclesiastical and other books without prior licence, as well as the importation, sale and
publication of English language texts printed on the continent. This Proclamation established
the precedent for the pre-publication licensing of literary works in England." Henrician
Proclamation,supra note 26.
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continued governmental control. 28 And even if this is too simplistic a
description of the stationers' copyright, monarchs continued to utilize
the parliament and other royal tools to pass laws that attempted to
retain governmental, rather than creator, control over knowledge
goods.
In the Anglo-American tradition, the goal of IP regulation is
explicitly couched in well-known utilitarian terms set forth in the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution. 29 The government
therefore has a very specific role to play in the policy choices
embedded in the design of national IP laws to serve the general public
interest. Considering the government's role in promoting the general
public good requires explicit acknowledgement of the conflicting
interests that arise from the government's direct financial stake in the
grant of exclusive rights in the cultural goods it creates or funds.
Federal agencies regularly partner with educational research
institutions, private industry, non-profit organizations, and other
entities to engage in research collaborations that produce innovation
leading to various IP grants. This is the model in most member
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). 30
In the US, state and local governments also are increasingly
engaged in partnerships with private industry, granting access to big
data to develop new products, goods, and services. There is no
question that in many cases, the private sector is better equipped to
utilize data-driven tools to address social problems and thus enhance
public welfare. 31 There can also be no question that public-private
partnerships have played and continue to play a critical role in
advancing scientific discovery and innovation. Even so, the
well-known challenges of the political economy of IP law-making, in
addition to the government's direct economic interest in the market
for creative works, make the policy landscape much murkier to
navigate when considering what options best promote public welfare.
It is conventional to justify copyright protection, and for that
matter all IP rights, as a means to advance the public interest. 32 The
28.
Ronan Deazley, Commentary on: Stationers' Charter (1557), PRIMARY SOURCES ON
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=
(2008),
COPYRIGHT
commentaryuk_1557 [http://perma.cc/7HEY-JVMY].
8.
U.S. CONST. art. 8, § 8,cl.
29.
30.

See

OECD, OECD

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY

SCOREBOARD

2013:

INNOVATION FOR GROWTH (2013) [hereinafter, SCOREBOARD 2013]. For a summary of OECD's
id.
at
area,
see
in
this
investment
governments'
of
various
findings
13-15.

31.
GOLDSMITH & S. CRAWFORD, supra note 21.
Nothing seems to confirm this elemental point more than the IP Clause itself. This
32.
Clause gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
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true end of the public welfare pillar upon which IP law purports to
rest is ensuring that the populace benefits from the creative
enterprise-not just in some abstract, speculative sense,3 3 but in real,
direct, and personal terms. Accordingly, an optimal vision of IP
regulation traditionally requires equilibrium between the exclusive
rights of creators and innovators and measures to ensure the public
has access to protected works. Such equilibrium may be achieved by
internal adjustments within IP law itself-the interminable search for
"balance" that is the focus of exceptions and limitations to the
through a
mandatory set of copyright's exclusive rights 34-or
combination of internal mechanisms and external supplementary
regimes such as unfair competition, consumer protection, or
antitrust. 35 Either way, actually securing the slice of the public good
effectuated through IP law requires intentional government
intervention in the innovation ecosystem; a very visible hand must
guide the socioeconomic and regulatory context in which the objectives
of IP rules can best be realized. 36 Careful regulation of the ubiquitous
web of technological infrastructure and IP policies that mediate the
conditions of welfare in the digital economy is a challenge for
governments worldwide. To begin, we must accept that the
government's role in setting IP policy is much more nuanced and,
certainly in the United States, that there can be serious conflict
between what is best for the public welfare and the government's own
economic interests in a system of strong IP rights.

securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." US CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Cf. The "ultimate aim" of copyright law is "to stimulate artistic creativity for the
33.
general public good." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
34.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
mandates a minimum set of rights all WTO Member States must accord to rights holders. See
generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. One way in which the TRIPS Agreement establishes this balance
is by setting these minimum standards, but then allowing Member States to enact "more
extensive protection than is required" under the Agreement. Id. at art. 1.
35.
See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006) (noting that
four different legal regimes have supported challenges to tying agreements: (1) the patent misuse
doctrine; (2) unfair competition under §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45;
(3) contracts tending to create a monopoly under §3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a;
(4) contracts in restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
36.
A recent Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Report
on innovation challenges governments to treat innovation "as a central tool of policy making" to
ensure policy coherence across a wide spectrum of government portfolios. ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE INNOVATION IMPERATIVE: CONTRIBUTING TO PRODUCTIVITY, GROWTH

AND WELL-BEING 16 (2015). The Report notes the need for complimentary policies to deal with
the disruptive effects of innovation, highlighting that "policy plays an important role in shaping
the relationship between innovation and inclusive growth." Id. at 21, 24.
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B. The Statutory Baseline for Government Ownership of Copyright
As already noted, § 105 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that
copyright protection does not inhere in works created by the US
Government. 37 In contrast, § 207 of the Patent Act permits federal
agencies to own patents on its inventions3 8 and there are many federal
agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Department of Commerce that produce
significant numbers of patents. 39 The federal government also actively
licenses its patents. 40 By maintaining patents, the government argues
that it effectively utilizes taxpayer dollars by conducting cutting-edge
research and then benefits the economy through transferring these
rights. 4'
The government is also allowed to protect its own
trademarks 42 and a search of the trademark registry reveals hundreds
of marks registered to "US Department of' owners. Moreover, the
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) enjoys an
exception to § 105 of the Copyright Act for its Standard Reference
Data. 43 The bottom line is that the government is an active participant
in the market for creative goods in all the categories of IP.
The statutory provision that prohibits the government from
securing copyright protection in its own creative works is rooted in
historical precedent. Access to judicial decisions was the principal
area of concern, and it was decided early on that such decisions should
be available for public use. 44 As the Supreme Court stated in Wheaton
v. Peters, "No reporter of the decisions of the supreme court [sic] has,
nor can he have, any copyright in the written opinions delivered by

37.
38.

Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).

39.

NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., US DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL LABORATORY

TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
FISCAL
YEAR
2012
5
(2014),
http://www.nist.gov/
tpo/publications/uploadFederal-Laboratory-TT-Report-FY2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/J34F-XAUE].
In 2014, for example, "the U.S. Government received 1024 utility patents." US PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS (UTILITY PATENTS) 2014, Al-1 (2015).
40.
APPROACH

See generally US DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
AND PLANS, FISCAL YEAR 2014 ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS 4-5 (2015),

http://www.nist.gov/tpo/publications/upload/DOC-FY2014-Annual-Tech-Transfer-DOC.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LJ9A-LU4G].
41.

NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., US DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL LABORATORY

TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
FISCAL
YEAR
2010
2
(2012),
http://www.nist.gov/tpo/
publications/upload/Fed-Lab-TTFINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/KV5J-XT94].
42.

15 U.S.C. § 1052.

43.
Standard Reference Data Act, 17 U.S.C. § 290e(a) (1968) ("Notwithstanding the
limitations under section 105 of title 17, the Secretary may secure copyright and renewa] thereof
on behalf of the United States as author or proprietor in all or any part of any standard reference
data which he prepares or makes available under this chapter, and may authorize the
reproduction and publication thereof by others.").
44.

Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 593 (1831).
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Another nineteenth century opinion, Nash v.
the court .... ,,45
Lathrop, came to a similar conclusion that "[t]he decisions and
opinions of the justices. .. are binding upon all the citizens .... Every
Like
."46
citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared ....
47
statutes, therefore, judicial opinions should be available to all.
Early copyright acts did not explicitly include a prohibition on
owning judicial opinions. Instead, the prohibition was a matter of
public policy largely articulated and enforced by the courts. This
policy was eventually codified in the Printing Act of 1895, which
stated that "no other government publication shall be copyrighted." 4
Subsequently, it took fourteen years for the prohibition on copyright in
federal government works to appear explicitly in a copyright statute in
49
§8 of the 1909 Copyright Act.
Despite the simplicity of § 8 of the 1909 Copyright Act, there
was some uncertainty about this provision.5 0 Section 8 stipulated that
"no copyright shall subsist ... in any publication of the United States
It was unclear, given the definitions-or lack
Government. '5 1
thereof-within the 1909 statute, whether this prohibition applied to
unpublished government works, those prepared only by government
employees or by private individuals on behalf of the government, or
52
whether the prohibition only applied to printed materials.
The 1976 Copyright Act cleared up some of the uncertainty.
The legislative history of § 105 maintains that: "The basic premise...
is the same as that of section 8 of the present law [Section 8 of former
Title 17]-that works produced for the U.S. Government by its officers
and employees should not be subject to copyright." 53 At the time the
1976 Act was adopted, some federal agencies argued for exceptions for
certain materials they produced. For example, the Department of
Commerce urged Congress to allow them to copyright a "limited
number of publications '54 from the National Technical Information
and Space
Service (NTIS), and the National Aeronautics
Administration (NASA) also argued in favor of an exception for
45.
Id.
Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35 (1886).
46.
Id.
47.
48.
The Printing Act, ch. 23, § 52, 28 Stat. 601, 608 (1895).
The Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (1909).
49.
John 0. Tresansky, Impact of the Copyright Act of 1909 on the Government, 35 FED.
50.
B.J. 22, 23 (1978).
Id.
51.
52.
The latter uncertainties were resolved by a 1964 Bureau of the Budget
memorandum, clarifying that a government publication was limited to those works that were
prepared by a government employee through their official duties. Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 59 (1976).
53.
54.

122 CONG. REC. 34225 (1976).
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terms

of the "exceptional
circumstances" exception, such a provision had already been
considered and was dropped in response to opposition in 1965.56
In conjunction with other provisions in the 1976 Act, the
restatement of the legal position on copyright in government works
actually clarified many of the outstanding concerns. Section 101, in
particular, explicitly defines what counts as a government work, 57 and
the legislative history of § 105 makes clear that the provision is
meant to apply to unpublished as well as published works. 58 With
respect to government-commissioned works, case law explores the
point that withholding protection from government works benefits the
public interest.5 9 Thus, the government could potentially withhold
copyright protection for commissioned works in pursuit of this
interest 60 consistently with the malleability of § 105.
Congress
definitely viewed the degree of access enabled by a lack of copyright as
a substantial benefit to the public.
Several arguments in favor of the presumptive public domain
status of federal government works center on the rationale that such
works are funded at public expense and so should be freely accessible
by the public. 6 1 Additionally, some commentators argue that in a
democratic society, government-created works should be disseminated
freely. 62 These arguments are maddeningly problematic, even if
correct in principle. Most OECD governments, including the United
States, fund a significant portion of the creative enterprise. 63 Basic
R&D funding galvanizes the applied research that is eventually
captured by the patent system, just as books, movies, software, and
music are the direct or indirect derivatives of basic investment in
education, literacy, and the arts. 64 IP laws thus tend to be a second55.
Copyright Law Revision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong. 1787-88 (1976).
56.
Id.
57.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
58.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 59.
59.
Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 108-09 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
60.
See id. at 108.
61.
Marvin J. Nodiff, Copyrightability of Works of the Federal and State Governments
Under the 1976 Act, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 93 (1984).
62.
Id.
63.
Examining the portion of gross domestic product (GDP) that countries put into R&D
demonstrates that significant resources are invested in this type of development. Research and
Development
Statistics
(RDS),
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/innovation/inno/
researchanddevelopmentstatisticsrds.htm [http://perma.cc/SM58-N6F8].
64.
To see how much each country puts into these areas, see Gross Domestic
Expenditure on R-D by Sector of Performance and Socio-Economic Objective, OECD,
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BERD INDUSTRY [http://perma.cc/2P9Q-AUK6].
For example, while the United States is the leader in R&D expenditures, with $415 billion of

[Vol. 18:2:331

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

346

level tax 65 on the public that, having already funded the necessary
elements of the creative society, must also pay in order to enjoy its
bounty of knowledge goods and innovation.
To be clear, this is not to say that access to knowledge goods or
innovation ought to be without some cost to specific users-only that
the cost to the public goes beyond the monopoly gains exclusive rights
make possible.
Other costs may include diminished access to
educational resources, burdens on free speech, and limited competition
in certain industries such as software. In short, the cost of the
copyright system, though difficult to validate empirically, can be
significant in terms of its broader socio-economic implications. When
the production of knowledge goods is largely made possible by direct
government subsidies there should be no right to exclude public access
to those goods as is possible under the current system or to charge the
full monopoly price that the IP privilege allows. Access to such goods
should be made available at lower cost; there simply is no good
argument for why rights owners are subsidized and the public is twice
taxed.
public
from
Limited
forms
of "rebates" to
the
government-funded research have begun to emerge in recent history.
One key example is the recent National Institutes of Health (NIH)
policy that requires grantees to make copies of journal articles
produced from government research grants accessible in public
repositories. 66 In the last decade, increasing numbers of higher
education institutions have adopted policies requiring faculty
members to make copies of their work available to the public in
university-funded repositories. 67 These various efforts reflect parallel

such expenditures in 2011, it is followed by China, Japan, Germany, and Korea. SCOREBOARD
2013, supra note 30, at 50. China provides an example of an emerging economy with significant
investment in research. Id. at 14.
65.
Thomas Babington Macaulay's speech to the House of Commons in 1841 famously
noted that the institution of copyright is a first-level tax on the public. "The principle of copyright
is this. It is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers." THOMAS BABINGTON
MACAULAY, Speeches to House of Commons on 5 Feb. 1842 Opposing Proposed Life & 60 Year
Copyright Term and on 6 April 1842 Favoringa 42-year Fixed Term Over a Life & 25 Year Term,
in

PROSE

AND

POETRY

(G.M. Young

ed.

1967),

http://homepages.law.asu.edu/

[http://perma.cc/
-dkarjalalOpposingCopyrightExtension/commentaryMacaulaySpeeches.html
SU9K-8ZNN].
Any manuscript that is peer-reviewed, accepted for publication on or after April 7,
66.
2008, and arises from NIH funding in some capacity is subject to this policy. Omnibus
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, Div. F, § 217 (2009); US DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV.,

NIH

Public

Access

Policy

Details,

NAT'L

INSTS.

OF

HEALTH,

https://publicaccess.nih.gov/policy.htm [https://perma.c/JUD2-3QQZ].
67.
For example, in a policy adopted in 2014 by the Board of Regents, faculty at the
University of Minnesota grant the University "a shared, limited, right to make available his or
her scholarly articles and to reproduce, display, and distribute those articles for the purpose of
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whereby

governments in several countries are mandating open-access research

communities to facilitate global research efforts addressing significant
68
issues of our time.
In short, IP rights may be a vehicle, among others, to
incentivize investment in the creative enterprise, but the design of
those rights should reflect the public's prior investment.
An
important justification for "balanced" IP regimes is not only that
exclusive rights may incentivize private investment in research and
creative activity, but the public's investment also deserves a return

beyond just the promise of new goods and services in the marketplace.
Otherwise, IP laws may truly become just another means of
redistributing income from those who have little to those with more
resources.

69

C. Access Despite Ownership
In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom and
Australia have very different rules on government ownership of
copyright. In the United Kingdom, the concept of "Crown copyright"

exists for government works. 70 It applies to "work[s] made by Her
Majesty or by an officer or servant of the Crown in the course of his
duties. ' 71 Under UK law, Crown copyright in unpublished works lasts
for 125 years, or, if the work is published fifty years from

open access." Administrative Policy: Open Access to Scholarly Articles, UNIV. OF MINN,
https://policy.umn.edu/researchischolarlyarticles [https:H/perma.cc/9ADM-ZX93].
68.
Jerome H. Reichman, The Limits of Limitations and Exceptions, in COPYRIGHT LAW
IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCCEPTIONS (Ruth L. Okediji ed., forthcoming CUP 2016)
(describing initiatives in the United States and the United Kingdom that mandate the pooling of
government-funded research results in the human genome project). Professor Reichman also
notes that "the scientific community has experimented with an ever growing number of both
mandatory and voluntary data-pooling initiatives that result either in semicommons frameworks
open to qualified participants working on related problems or in fully open-access research
commons, in which data and information are made available to the world at large." Id.
69.
Certain cases evidence the fact that in some instances, copyright law is particularly
deferential to the judgment of the elite class. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir.
2013) (characterizing misappropriation as redistribution in describing how the secondary work
was being sold for millions of dollars, while the original work was barely profitable);
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that
high-end belt buckles could be copyrighted because they have artistic elements that are separate
from the useful articles themselves).
70.
Fact Sheet
P-O: UK
Copyright Law,
UK
COPYRIGHT
SERVICE,
https://www.copyrightservice.co.uklcopyright/pOl-uk.copyright-law
[https://perma.cc/RN5ZXGAX]. This concept of Crown copyright applies in all Commonwealth countries. Copyright, CAN.
ASS'N OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES, http://www.carl-abrc.ca/en/public-policy/Copyright/crowncopyright.html [http://perma.ccMJgK-72XA].
71.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. X, § 163, (UK).

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

348

[Vol. 18:2:331

publication. 72 Australia has a similar rule and has issued guidance to
their government agencies about how to best manage their IP
73
interests.
Interestingly, countries that provide for seemingly stronger IP
rights in government works usually establish mechanisms that
facilitate access to those works. For example, the National Archives in
the United Kingdom is in charge of managing Crown copyright, a duty
that includes licensing such materials through a comprehensive
The National Archives also
governmental licensing scheme. 74
delegates authority to agencies and departments within the
government, in order for such departments to facilitate their own
licensing, 75 typically for no more than a nominal fee if at all.
Nordic countries provide another useful example of a
legislatively crafted licensing scheme for government-owned creative
works. For example, Denmark's Copyright Act does not contain a
provision excluding all government works from copyright protection,
although acts and official documents are not protected. 76 Instead, the
Act provides access in the form of Extended Collective Licenses
(ECLs). 77 ECLs, which are also utilized in Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden, are a mass licensing system agreed to by a large group of
rights holders that facilitate access to protected works.7 8 Copyright
law in Denmark (and other Nordic countries) does not specify the
content of these agreements but does extend their application to rights
holders not represented during the formation of the agreement. 79
These legislatively mandated schemes to promote access to
government works illustrate the point that the entities that control
ownership of cultural goods also control access to them, and that
ownership can be used to facilitate access to knowledge goods, not just
to maximize rent. Ownership can be at least as effective, or even a
better, means of ensuring access to creative works and advancing
innovation.

72.

FactSheet, supra note 70.

73.

A'rr'Y-GEN.'S DEPT, THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RULES

https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/IntellectualProperty/Documents/Quickguide
1,
totheAusGovIPRules.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XFF-D5JJI.
See infra Part III.
74.
75.

Crown

Copyright, NAT'L

ARCHIVES

(UK),

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/

information-management/re-using-public-sector-information/copyright-and-re-use/crowncopyright] [http://perma.cc/C4WM-ZVC8].
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 (Act No. 202) (Den.), § 9.
76.
Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic
77.
Experience-4t's a Hybrid but is it a Volvo or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471, 472 (2010).
Id. at 474.
78.
Id. at 476.
79.
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At first blush, a government's baseline rule about its copyright
ownership in its works could reflect particular normative ideas about
public welfare and the relationship between access to knowledge goods
and socioeconomic development.8 0 Indeed, the particular baseline rule
selected by a country may illustrate the government's ultimate sense
of obligation to ensure that all citizens have the opportunity to enjoy
the benefits of the good life. In the digital environment, government
ideologies about copyright and public welfare will be repeatedly tested
in light of new mechanisms that make access to vast amounts of data
and creativity possible. Analyzing emerging models of government
regulation of big data will help underscore the important and different
roles the government can play not only as owner of vast amounts of
data that fuels innovation, but also as steward of the public interest.
The rules employed in the regulation of big data could become one of
the most important measures of public welfare in the digital
information age.

III. EMERGING PROSPECTS FOR ENHANCING WELFARE IN A
DATA-DRIVEN DIGITAL ECONOMY
The implications of differing approaches to government
ownership are reflected in business models that have emerged to
respond to the way in which governments deal with intellectual
property. Open-access models and Creative Commons (CC) licenses
are two examples of ways in which the government has influenced
both public and private actors to make the intellectual property arena
a more accessible environment. This Part reviews current practices in
the UK and Australia, two common law countries where the statutory
rule regarding government works vests copyright ownership in the
government.
A. Government Licensing and Crown Copyright in the United
Kingdom
As mentioned previously, the United Kingdom does not
prohibit government ownership of copyrights in the same way that the
United States does.
Perhaps in response to the more limited
availability of government works, the United Kingdom has developed

80.
Because intellectual property is continually creating a "larger share of economic
value, policy makers will be confronted with a growing need to balance the benefits of gaining
control over [intellectual assets] against the benefits of mobility and open access." OECD,
INTELLECTUAL ASSETS AND VALUE CREATION: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2008).
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a licensing framework for "public sector information."8'
The UK
Government Licensing Framework (UKGLF) allows more open access
to government works8 2 through "[t]he removal of barriers to re-use, by
introducing simple and transparent licensing processes .... ,,83 The
UKGLF is limited to copyright and database rights8 4 and is not
available for rights that the government acquired, rather than
created.8 5 But when the licensing scheme is applicable, it can
manifest in different ways.
First, there is the Open Government License (OGL), which
allows
"re-use
for
all
purposes,
both
commercial
and
8
6
non-commercial.
Under the OGL, information can be used for any
purpose so long as an attribution statement is included.8 7 Second, the
Non-Commercial Government License applies in more restricted
circumstances.8 8 Information made available under this license can
only be reused for a noncommercial purpose, again with an attribution
statement.8 9 Finally, the Charged License is available when charges
are levied for the re-use of information. 90 Within this scheme, any
charges levied "must be limited to the marginal costs incurred in
respect of the reproduction, provision, and dissemination of
documents." 91 Regulations dictate the guidelines for these charges
and stress that they should not exceed direct costs, surpass cost of
overhead, or diminish a reasonable return on investment for
producing the document. 92 Other legislative directives, such as
freedom of information statutes, may intersect with these licenses in
that information that "is not accessible under information access
93
legislation ...falls outside the scope" of these government licenses.
Additionally, some information acquired through the use of

81.

NAT'L ARCHIVES, UK GOVERNMENT LICENSING FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC SECTOR

INFORMATION 4 (4.1 ed. 2014), http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/informationmanagement/uk-government-licensing-framework.pdf [http://perma.cc/AN79-RR7W] [hereinafter
NAT'L ARCHIVES 1].

82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 5.
84.
Id. at 6. Database rights protect the effort involved in the creation of a database,
and they last for fifteen years from the date on which the database was open to the public. UK
OFFICE OF LIBRARY & INFO. NETWORKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO DATABASE RIGHTS (2009).
85.
NAT'L ARCHIVES 1, supra note 81, at 9.

86.
87.

Id. at 13.
Id.

88.

Id. at 14.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id. at 15.
The Re-Use of Public Sector Information Regulations 2015, § 15 tbl. 2.42 (UK).
Id.

93.

NAT'L ARCHIVES 1, supra note 81, at 7.
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information acts may be subject to copyright and require permission to
94
use.
Guidelines promulgated by the National Archives for the
United Kingdom underscore that "[t/he Open Government [License]
should be the default [license] where public sector information is made
available for re-use free of charge. ' 95
These Guidelines urge
governmental departments to make information available free of
charge in order to maximize "the social and economic value of the
information. ' 96 The OGL has been embraced by many government
departments at various levels, including Ministerial departments,
executive agencies, and local councils. 97 This preference suggests that
the UK government may negatively view restrictions on use that are
inserted in the Non-Commercial Government License.
In contrast, an agency or department using an OGL must
provide an attribution statement and notice that the underlying IP is
being made available pursuant to the license. 98 And while charging
for use is allowed, it is subject to many additional rules and
regulations.
First, the charge should be assessed to only cover
marginal costs, and departure from this calculation must be justified
against specific criteria. 99 These criteria include the context in which
the information is situated, the cost of producing it, its availability
elsewhere, the conditions of the market, and other considerations. 100
In effect, the policy taxes any effort to deviate from free use of the
work, which is a clear reversal of the author- or owner-centric
paradigm that pervades contemporary copyright law.
What the licensing system in the United Kingdom suggests is
that even when government (or other) works can obtain some level of
protection under traditional copyright law, the public interest may be
better served by nevertheless making the information freely available
94.

Id. at 5, 8.

95.

Id. at 12.

96.
Id.
97.
For example, the copyright statement for the Ministry of Defense explains that
certain images on its site are available through the Open Government License. MOD Copyright
Statement, MINISTRY OF DEF. (UK), http://www.defenceimagery.mod.uklfotoweb/Copyright.fwx

[http://perma.cc/94F3-CG4T];
see
also
Open
Data,
WYRE
COUNCIL
(UK),
http://www.wyre.gov.uk/opendata [http://perma.cc/JH8Q-Y2HP] (explaining that the information
on the site is available under the Open Government License and providing an attribution
statement); Terms and Conditions, HIGHWAYS ENGLAND, http://www.highways.gov.uk/terms.
and-conditions/ [http://perma.cc/JF48-ZLB2] (stating that all the information on the website,
excluding logos, is available under the Open Government License).
98.

NAT'L ARCHIVES 1, supra note 81, at 13.

99.

Id. at 12.

100.

NAT'L ARCHIVES (UK),

CRITERIA FOR EXCEPTIONS TO MARGINAL COST PRICING

(2009),
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.ukldocuments/information-management/criteriaexceptions- marginal-cost-pricing.pdf [http://perma.cc/AZJ9-KX79].
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to the public, even with certain conditions attached. Admittedly, the
UK licensing model attaches more restrictions to the use of
government works than may be ideal, where none ostensibly would be
needed in the United States, since the lack of copyright protection
precludes any restrictions ab initio.1° 1 In reality, however, the amount
of works that fall under the proscription in § 105 may be quite limited
compared to what the government actually owns. This is due to the
manipulation of the legislative language that allows the government
to be the assignee of IP rights it did not create and to be a royalty-free
licensee of other works created by sub-contractors or other agents.1 0 2
That being said, the UK licensing scheme underscores the unique
position the government holds with respect to its intellectual property.
Even when granted similar rights as private authors, the role of the
government in protecting the public interest should temper this
protection and encourage access to-and use of-such works with the
least possible transaction costs levied on the public. Indeed, taxing
efforts to burden access to such works is a strong signal regarding the
value the government places on access to protected works in the
digital economy.
Such an open-access, limited transaction cost regime does not
have to be mandated by the government, however. Creative Commons
licenses offer a similar scheme with a similar purpose, which is
private in nature.'0 3 These default licenses-essentially terms of
use-permit copyright owners to craft individualized licenses
10 4
reflecting the terms and conditions of access or use by the public.
While imperfect solutions to the general problem of imbalanced
copyright laws, 10 5 CC licenses do mediate between users and owners in

101.
In reality, however, it may be that the UK licensing model actually facilitates more
access to works that the government owns because there is no analogous access regime for the
number of works in which the government does own a copyright.
102.
17 U.S.C. § 105 (2015); CENDI, supra note 17, at 4.9 ("The Federal awarding agency
reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive and irrevocable right to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use
the work for federal purposes, and to authorize others to do so."). So, in fact, the government may
own valuable intellectual property rights through this legislative loophole, where copyrights are
either transferred to it or it is allowed to use protected works without paying a royalty. In terms
of all IP rights, estimates for 2010 show that the government earned roughly $250 million in
licensing and royalty fees. NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., US DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL
LABORATORY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FISCAL YEAR 2010 21 (2012), http://www.nist.gov/
tpo/publications/uploadFed-Lab-TT_- FINAL.pdf [http://perma.ccKV5J-XT94].
103.
Interestingly, the UK licensing scheme is explicitly described as being "compatible
with the Creative Commons Attribution license." NAT'L ARCHIVES 1, supra note 81, at 10.
104.
History, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/abouthistory [https://
perma.ccSYB6-AXSH].
105.
See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Orderingin
Facilitatinga Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 378 (2005) (expressing skepticism
about the legal strategy of Creative Commons).
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a way that facilitates most noncommercial uses of copyrighted content.
CC does not track the number of licenses being used, 10 6 but
governments, such as that of Australia, are utilizing the benefits of CC
107
licenses.
B. Creative Commons Licenses and Crown Copyright in
Australia
Australia provides an interesting intersection between the UK
licensing model and the Creative Commons approach. In Australia,
access to government works has been the subject of an ongoing
discussion, with the Commonwealth
Government
continually
producing reports that encourage open access to public sector
information10 8 A Copyright Law Review Committee was formed to
consider reforms to Crown copyright, and it made a series of
recommendations that would have limited Crown copyright in certain
circumstances. 0 9 Yet no legislative response was actually achieved." 10
Instead, the Australian government relies on Creative Commons
licensing."' For example, Australian agencies such as the Australian
Bureau of Statistics "are licensing much of their output using Creative
Commons licences ...."112
Some commentators argue that the Australian government's
reliance on CC licenses means that efforts to preclude copyright
protection for works of the Australian government will be less
successful. 1 3
The policy of the Australian Commonwealth
Government is to "openly licence [public sector information] and the
Creative Commons standard is being used as the default." 114 Of the
myriad licensing options that CC offers, the default for the Australian
government appears to be the Attribution License. 115 This license is
106.
Frequently Asked Questions, CREATIVE COMMONS, https:/fwiki.creativecommons.org/
wikilFrequently.AskedQuestions#DoesCreativeCommonscollect or trackmaterials-license
d under aCC license.3F [https:H/perma.cc/QE8F-CUJ7].
107.
Judith Bannister, Open Government: From Crown Copyright to the Creative
Commons and Culture Change, 34 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1080, 1091-96 (2011),
http://www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/46_banniester.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
MH9G-VXGT].
108.
Id. at 1091.
109.
Id. at 1095.
110.
Id. at 1096.
111.
Id.
112.
AUSTRALIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT 2.0, xiv-xii (2009),
http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/gov20taskforcereport/doc/Government2OTaskforceReport.
pdf [http://perma.cc/4524-W44Y].
113.
Bannister, supra note 107, at 1096-97.
114.
Id. at 1099.
115.
Id.
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similar to the OGL in the United Kingdom in that all that is required
is attribution-no other limitations are imposed. 116 The United
Kingdom explicitly conforms to the "Open Definition," a definition
created by the international non-profit Open Knowledge.1 17 Open
Definition strives to maximize interoperability and sets standards for
the creation of "open works."' "18 In essence, "Open Definition" is an
access standard that ensures compatibility between different
collections of open materials so that people can move seamlessly
between data without technical or legal barriers. This illustrates how
open-access licensing regimes can be complementary, drawing on
other resources like CC or the Open Definition to continue to optimize
access and diffusion of knowledge.
Australia's adoption of the CC license may seem to put its
access model on equal footing with the United Kingdom, however the
Guidelines produced by the Attorney General's Department make
clear that such licensing schemes are only applied to works on a caseby-case basis."19 Due diligence is required to determine whether such
a license is an appropriate course of action. 120 Some of the criteria
listed for making this determination include whether the
Commonwealth has an interest in maintaining control over the work
and whether third-party copyright on parts of the material exists,
12
among others. '
C. To Own or Not to Own: Does the Statutory Default Rule
Matter?
Many other countries, particularly members of the British
Commonwealth or former British colonies in Africa, Asia and the
Caribbean also have a system of Crown copyright. As developing
countries, very few have actively pursued open data policies and even
fewer recognize exceptions to Crown copyright. Government
ownership of copyright that merely erects barriers to access and use
by innovators, creators, and members of the general public constitutes
a deadweight loss on the innovation infrastructure such as it exists in
those countries. These 'closed copyright' models appear to harken
back to the earliest use of copyright law to censor, control, or
otherwise limit access and dissemination of government-generated

116.

Id. at 1099; NAT'L ARCHIVES 1, supra note 81, at 10.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

About, OPEN KNOWLEDGE, https:lokfn.orglabout/[https://perma.cc/8E57-JSMG].
OPEN DEFINITION, http:/lopendefinition.org/od/ [http://perma.cc/T6KU-MHGN].
Bannister, supra note 107, at 1100.
Id.
Id.
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information. In many cases, they are simply holdovers from colonial
legislation and do not reflect any meaningful policy choices by
incumbent governments. In either case, government ownership of
copyright in its works as an end in itself cannot justifiably remain the
status quo. Developing countries, too, must begin to consider how
massive data sets can advance innovation and promote eco-systems of
creative new applications, goods, and services to improve human
welfare. Indeed, government ownership of its own works is one of the
few areas in which recent harmonization of international copyright
rules under the TRIPS Agreement has not eroded any government
flexibility. All countries can take full advantage of this policy space to
design flexible default rules that maximize the public's investment in
the data assets that fuel innovation today and that hold significant
promise for the future.
A government's default rule matters a great deal in an
environment in which the capacity to create policies for inclusive
growth forces consideration of the circumstances in which government
ownership may enable better bargains with downstream creators that
benefit the public. Setting a one-size-fits-all rule seems ill-advised; a
rule that facilitates flexibility and permits benefit-sharing between
creators and the public would be optimal. The models of both the
United Kingdom and Australia demonstrate that there is strong
interest in allowing access to government works, even if copyright
protection subsists in such works. The model of copyright ownership
plus default CC or other common-use license allows flexibility for
governments to exercise a residual right to adapt licenses to specific
circumstances, rewarding the innovator/creator at greater or lesser
rates depending the nature of the knowledge asset involved. In a USlike model, the government ostensibly has no need for such licenses
because its works are already in the public domain. However, as
noted earlier, the number of government works subject to copyright is
not insignificant, suggesting that the US public could benefit from a
copyright policy that clearly adopts access as a default rule, and to
leverage that rule to facilitate greater public benefit from downstream
data driven knowledge assets.
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IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS FOR A
DIGITAL WELFARE STATE

A. Models for Regulating Access to Government Data and Downstream
Creativity
The various regulatory schemes described above suggest an
emerging multi-national view that government works should be
openly accessible, even if such access is facilitated through a
governmentally mandated regulatory scheme. The US model, which
denies protection for government works, 122 presumptively serves as a
good starting point for an optimal access regime; but in reality, the
various exceptions that exist give the government much more
proprietary control over content, data, and creative works than might
otherwise be suggested by the statutory prohibition. This control
opens up room for creatively addressing the terms of access to
knowledge goods created from big data.
At least three approaches are possible: (1) adopt an open-data
policy-preferably one with clear objectives and purposes-with no
conditions imposed on the public's access to downstream creative
works (pure open-data model); (2) condition use of data by innovators
on conditions that optimize access to downstream knowledge goods by
citizens (conditioned open-data model); (3) maintain government
ownership of data but make the data as well as any downstream
creative works freely available (proprietary model). Adoption of one of
these models as the default baseline for access to and use of a
particular set of government data does not preclude adoption of
another model for data possessing different characteristics. Indeed,
determining the conditions of access and use of government data
should not be subject to a one-size-fits-all approach, but should be
made with due regard to the properties of the data set involved as well
the relevant public interest(s) at stake.
1. Pure Open-Data Model
As noted earlier, the current approach employed by the US
federal government allows for the free dissemination of its data, yet
defers to market mechanisms to determine ownership, access, and use
of any downstream applications. Apart from policies that restrict
access to data altogether, this approach seems to be the least
resourceful in terms of enhancing the aggregate gains to the public
from open diffusion of data. Allowing private actors to freely access
122.

17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).

2016] GOVERNMENT AS OWNER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?

357

and use government-owned data to create privately-owned works may
be unobjectionable in principle, but it is also sub-optimal if this is the
model employed for all data regardless of the potential impact on the
supply of public goods. Health care-related data, for example, should
be used to benefit public health at minimum cost to the government
and to the public. Educational data should be similarly treated.
In a pure open-access model, barriers imposed on the public's
access to government data as well as to any downstream creative
works are removed. Implementation of such a model comprises two
essential components: (1) mandating government agencies to release
data in a way that enables its downstream processing and usage,
subject to review of the data for privacy, confidentiality, security, and
other lawful restrictions to release; and (2) requiring owners of the
rights in downstream creative works to disseminate their works free
of charge through open licenses.
As regards the first component (mandatory data release by
government), the pure open-data model is consistent with an approach
adopted by the Obama administration in its Executive Order of May 9,
2013, entitled Making Open and Machine Readable the New Default
for Government Information. 123 To achieve its stated goal of "making
information resources easy to find, accessible, and usable" 124 by the
public, a Memorandum 125 issued by the Executive Office of the
President pursuant to this Executive Order mandates federal
government agencies to implement a number of essential tasks. These
include: (1) collect or create data in a way that supports downstream
processing and dissemination activities; 126 (2) build information
127
systems to support interoperability and data accessibility;
(3) implement effective data asset portfolio management ensuring that

123.
Exec. Order No. 13, 642, 78 Fed. Reg. 28,111 (May 14, 2013). See also, Executive
Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Increasing Access to the
Results of Federally Funded Scientific Research, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
2013), available
22,
(Feb
and
Agencies
Departments

at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ostp--publicaccess-me
mo_2013.pdf oast visited Jan. 10, 2016).
Id., § 1.
124.
125.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT MEMORANDUM FOR
THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (May 9, 2013).

126.
Id., Attachment, 111.1. Specifically, the Memorandum requires executive agencies to:
(1) use machine-readable and open formats; (2) use data standards; (3) ensure information
stewardship through the use of open licenses; and (4) use common core and extensible metadata.
Id.
127.
Id., Attachment, 111.2. To achieve this goal, the Memorandum requires, in
particular, that "system design must be scalable, flexible, and facilitate extraction of data in
multiple formats and for a range of uses as internal and external needs change, including
potential uses not accounted for in the original design." Id.
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data are appropriately maintained throughout their life cycle; 128
(4) ensure that privacy and confidentiality are fully protected and that
data are secure; 129 and (5) incorporate new interoperability and
openness requirements into core agency processes. 130
As regards the second component (mandatory dissemination of
downstream creative works via open licenses), the pure open-data
model does not rule out IP protection of downstream knowledge goods
created using government data. Like the copyright default baseline,
this position defers to market mechanisms to determine ownership,
recognizing that denial of IP protection for downstream works may
impede investment in innovative activities. Further, such denial
would result in suboptimal diffusion of knowledge goods due to the
likely deployment of technological protection measures and
contractual restrictions by creators. Instead, the pure open-data
model, while not denying IP protection of downstream creativity,
prevents the deployment of access-restrictive mechanisms, including
the unilateral exercise of rights to impair public enjoyment of new
goods and services.
2. Conditioned Open-Data Model
In a conditioned open-data model, release of data by the
government ismade contingent on ensuring that an adequate return
accrues to the public for use of the data. This approach mimics the
rationale of the Shelby Amendment adopted in 1999 by the US
Congress, 31 which mandated that the Office of Management and
Budget require federal agencies to ensure that "all data produced
under [a federally-funded] award [is] made available to the public
through the procedures established under the Freedom of Information
Act [FOIA]. ' ' 132 A real-world template for a conditioned open-data
model is the public-access policy utilized by the NIH. Under this
policy, frequently utilized by universities and other research

128.
Id., Attachment, 111.3. The Memorandum calls on government agencies to: (1) create
and maintain an enterprise data inventory; (2) create and maintain a public data listing;
(3) create a process to engage with customers to help facilitate and prioritize data release; and
(4) clarify roles and responsibilities for promoting efficient and effective data release practice. Id.
Id., Attachment, III.4.
129.
130.
Id., Attachment, 111.5.
131.
Omnibus Consolidated & Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 (Oct. 21, 1998) (commonly referred to at the Shelby
Amendment).
132.

ERIC A. FISCHER, PUBLIC ACCESS TO DATA FROM FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH:

PROVISIONS IN OMB CIRCULAR A-110 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42983.pdf
[https://perma.ccI9WH6-64GE]. The Amendment still allows protection of data that includes
personal and confidential information. Id.
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institutions,
scientists
are
obligated
to
submit
final
peer-reviewed journal manuscripts that arise from NIH funding to a
freely accessible full-text archive (PubMed Central) immediately upon
acceptance of the manuscripts for publication. This scheme thus
ensures a return to the public in the form of open access to the
outcomes of NIH-sponsored research, while not negating IP ownership
interests of downstream creators.
Additional salient examples of attempts to widen the scope of
open-access materials are the so-called Open Educational Resources
(OERs). 13 3 OERs are useful tools for "marginalized learners" to have
134
the ability to access these materials and actively utilize them.
Several organizations have recently petitioned the US federal
government to follow the NIH and "ensure that educational materials
created with federal funds are openly licensed and released to the
1 35
public as OER."
3. Proprietary Model
In a proprietary model, the government retains ownership of
its data and works and chooses to disseminate them in accordance
with a prescribed policy to advance the public interest.
Such
dissemination can be made conditional or unconditional, depending on
the type of data or interest involved, and can be made applicable both
to works that have been created by the government as well as to
acquired works. Use of a CC license in conjunction with government
ownership of copyright is one example of an enlightened option for
governments. A one-size default rule could certainly serve as a
rational baseline for big data policies linked to the production of
copyrightable works. Governments, however, should be willing to
consider tailor-made policies for specific categories of data,
particularly with regard to data applicable to innovation directed at
supplying public goods. The government could leverage its ownership
stake, to ensure that optimal bargains are struck between accessors of
data and the cost to the public of the knowledge goods ultimately
created. Examples of a viable proprietary model include the UK
Government Licensing Framework, which categorizes government
works and attaches varied licensing conditions on their access and

133.

Open

Educational Resources (OERs), JOINT

INFO.

SYS.

COMMITTEE

(UK),

https://jisc.ac.uk/full-guide/open-educational-resources [https://perma.ccW63E-AENTJ.
134.

Id.

135.
See Cable Green, U.S. Secretary of Education Highlights Schools Using OER to
#GoOpen, CREATIVE COMMONS, (Sept. 15, 2015), http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry45984
[http://perma.cc/59TT-PFGKI.

360

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 18:2:331

use, and the approach adopted by Australia, which relies on CC
13 6
licenses subject to careful consideration of competing stakes.
B. Considerationson the Way Forward
The need to consider the characteristics of the welfare state in
the digital era offers an opportunity for reconsideration of the
government's role as producer and owner of information and
knowledge assets. The baseline rules, and any associated exceptions,
must be assessed critically when devising appropriate policies for the
management and use of the government's largest asset-data.
Important new data-driven initiatives at the federal, state, and local
levels are emerging, 13 7 and the copyright status of the data or final
product are becoming far less salient in deliberations about digital
governance. This trend is promising but must be sustained by an
affirmative rule that facilitates access to data, use of government
funded works, and an open-access default rule that enhances the
value of the content created and owned by the government. Recently,
governments have begun to fund transnational research initiatives
predicated on data pooling by scientists within an open-access
model. 138 The creation of such autonomous semi-commons holds
promising applications for research and innovation. But above all,
government-mandated research commons illustrate the importance of
open resources to engender efficient utilization of a vast database of
scientific information for potentially significant applications to
address some of the most enduring problems of this generation.
Access to these applications should not be later impeded by the
unconstrained exercise of IP rights by private actors who are
beneficiaries of the public's largesse.

136.

See supra Part III.

137.

See supra Part I at note 14 and Part II at note 21. See also, e.g., GOLDSMITH &

CRAWFORD, supra note 21; MCKINSEY, supra note 3; Rich, supra note 21; Diane Cardwell, At
Newark Airport, the Lights Are On, and They're Watching You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18lbusiness/at-newark-airport-the-lights-are-on-and-theyrewatching-you.html?_r=0 (describing a technological platform being tested by the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey at the Newark Liberty International Airport, which "collects and
feeds data into software that can spot long lines, recognize license plates and even identify
suspicious activity, sending alerts to the appropriate staff'); S. Hyman, Enforcement and Data:
One New York City Agency's Vision for a Level Playing Field, DATA SMART CITY SOLUTIONS, Aug.
13,
2013,
http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/
enforcement-and-data-280 (discussing the New York City Business Integrity Commission's
initiatives to "enable licensing and enforcement decisions driven by data"); D. Slack, Computer
System
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27,

2009,

http://www.cityofboston.gov/news/Default.aspx?id=4601 (detailing a computer tracking system
that has improved response time to citizen complaints in Boston).
138.
See Okediji & Reichman, supra note 10.
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V. CONCLUSION
A country's baseline rule on copyright ownership of government
works may not reveal the true welfare commitments of its big data
policies or other policies that support access to knowledge goods. For
example, in the United States, works created by the federal
government are not entitled to copyright protection, but the
government in fact owns a significant amount of proprietary goods.
Government ownership of IP is neither inherently "good" or "bad"-it
is how the government uses or leverages its ownership interest to
advance access by the public to newly created works that matters.
The public welfare justifications that support the default public
domain status of US government works under the 1976 Copyright Act
have not proven to be superior policy for innovation, nor to facilitate
the distributive justice goals of the IP system. In short, public domain
status is not synonymous with the public welfare.
In contrast, the copyright laws of the United Kingdom and
Australia formally grant protection to government works in the form
of a Crown copyright, but several models have emerged that temper
the impact of these copyright grants in government works and
encourage robust public access. The same is true in other OECD
countries that, for example, rely on modified CC licenses to ensure
access, use, and dissemination of government funded works.
Open data policies that genuinely seek to maximize welfare
gains from data-driven innovation should ensure that downstream
applications of works created from free or heavily subsidized access to
big data is available to the broader public at marginal cost or not
much more. The government could give incentives to creators to
ensure that the cost of access by the public reflects at least part of the
value of the underlying data granted under an open data policy. This
could be done by adopting CC or common use-licenses in conjunction
with government ownership of copyright.
In the absence of clear legislative direction in the 1976 US
Copyright Act about state government ownership of its copyrightable
works, state governments arguably have greater leeway to experiment
with a variety of approaches to link its open data policies to copyright
ownership of works created from the data. Asserting proprietary
rights in data-driven innovation would enable federal and state
governments to develop appropriate conditions that ensure more
members of the public have access to any new works created. While
creators of such works may, like other copyright proprietors, leverage
their exclusive rights to generate rent, the terms and conditions under
which the exercise of proprietary rights occurs should be part of the
government's design of innovation policy in an era of big data.
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In sum, full and equal access to government works should be
viewed as an indispensable feature of the welfare state in the digital
era.
A commitment to the elusive copyright balance requires
reconsideration of copyright (and IP) baseline rules that merely
maintain the status quo which preserves access for an elite minority,
rather than investing in conditions that facilitate wealth creation
through optimal access by many to the rich array of taxpayer-funded
knowledge goods engendered by big data.

